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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—BALLOT INITIATIVES AND DIRECT
DEMOCRACY—AMENDMENT 100 TO THE ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION:
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES SURROUNDING BALLOT INITIATIVES AND LOCAL
LEGISLATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The local politics of Pope County, Arkansas, erupted into turmoil in the
summer of 2018. After uneventful decades, proposed Amendment 100 to the
Arkansas Constitution came on the horizon in the form of a ballot initiative
circulating the state. The proposed amendment, “The Arkansas Casino Gaming Amendment of 2018” (hereinafter “Amendment 100” or “the Amendment”), upset the political equilibrium of Pope County. The Amendment
sought to authorize casino gaming in Arkansas, but in a very specific form.1
The Amendment’s regulations (exceptionally long and detailed for a constitutional amendment) specify four counties for authorized casino licenses:
Garland, Crittenden, Jefferson, and Pope.2 From its uncertain start as a ballot
initiative petition that summer, the Amendment became a more concrete
possibility when the Secretary of State certified the petition signatures and
the issue was placed on the November 2018 statewide ballot.3 At the election, the Amendment passed by a four percent margin across the state and
became part of the Arkansas Constitution.4
The Amendment, before and after passage, has divided Pope County
and brought on serious accusations of local government corruption. While
the issue was “up in the air,” county residents divided on the desirability of
having a casino. Some challenged the sufficiency of the ballot title.5 A county-wide ballot initiative offered Pope County voters the choice to vote for or
against an ordinance designed to give control over the casino decision to
local voters by requiring the quorum court or county judge to wait until
county residents had voted to approve the issuance of a letter of support, a
necessary part of the casino license application under Amendment 100.6
1. ARK. CONST. amend. C, § 3, cl. (a).
2. Id. at § 4, cl. (i)–(k).
3. ARKANSAS SECRETARY OF STATE, NOTICE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
PROPOSED BY PETITION OF THE PEOPLE (2018), https://www.sos.arkansas.gov
/uploads/elections/Issue_4_for_Website.pdf.
4. Arkansas Secretary of State, Issues, 2018 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS FOR
ARKANSAS, https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/AR/92174/Web02-state.226435/#/c/C_4
(last updated June 6, 2019, 10:09 AM).
5. See, e.g., Knight v. Martin, 2018 Ark. 280, 556 S.W.3d 501; Stiritz v. Martin, 2018
Ark. 281, 556 S.W.3d 523.
6. ARK. CONST. amend. C, § 4, cl. (n).
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Pope County voters passed the ordinance sixty-eight percent to thirty-two
percent in the same election where they rejected the proposed constitutional
amendment sixty percent to forty percent.7
Since the Amendment’s passage, vocal groups of Pope County residents on both sides of the issue have continued to war about the desirability
of a casino. The issue has also made a rift between local officials and their
constituents. Even though an overwhelming percentage of Pope County voters voted for the local ordinance, the Pope County Quorum Court voted in
August 2019 to issue a resolution in favor of a would-be casino applicant.8
In issuing the resolution, the quorum court did not comply with the ordinance’s requirements, even though no court had yet ruled on the validity of
the ordinance.9 The quorum court eventually repealed the ordinance, and the
county judge issued a letter of support for the same applicant.10
The conflict continues to play out at both state and local levels. For example, over a year after Amendment 100 passed, the casino issue dominated
the justice-of-the-peace races in Pope County.11 The Arkansas Racing
Commission, tasked with choosing a casino licensee, did not choose an applicant until the summer of 2020; the Commission then chose an applicant
whose local support came from outgoing officials immediately following the
Amendment’s passage.12 Litigation between rival casino applicants is ongoing.13
This situation is not the result of some underlying turmoil in Pope
County that finally broke out. An unusual, perhaps unprecedented, set of
circumstances sparked the action: through the ballot initiative process, the
people of Arkansas (the whole state) approved a constitutional amendment
7. Arkansas Secretary of State, 2018 General Election Results for Pope County, Arkansas, https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/AR/Pope/92233/Web02.221448/#/ (last updated
Nov. 16, 2018, 4:19 PM).
8. Jeannie Roberts, JPs Opt to Back Cherokee Group for New Casino, Hotel near I-40,
ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Aug. 14, 2019, 7:08 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com
/news/2019/aug/14/jps-opt-to-back-cherokee-group-for-new-/.
9. Id. A Pope County judge later ruled that the ordinance unconstitutionally conflicted
with Amendment 100; the Supreme Court of Arkansas dismissed the appeal of the decision
as moot after the quorum court repealed the ordinance. Citizens for a Better Pope Cty. v.
Cross, 2020 Ark. 279, at 2, 606 S.W.3d 580, 580.
10. Citizens for a Better Pope Cty., 2020 Ark. 279, at 2–4, 606 S.W.3d at 580–81.
11. Jeannie Roberts, Divisions on Pope County Casino Fueling Justice-of-the-Peace
Races, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Feb. 9, 2020, 9:13 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com
/news/2020/feb/09/divisions-on-casino-fueling-jp-races-20/.
12. Jeannie Roberts, Consultant Picks Cherokees’ Casino Bid as Best, ARK. DEMOCRAT
GAZETTE (July 23, 2020, 7:20 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2020
/jul/23/consultant-picks-cherokees-casino-bid-as-best/?business.
13. See, e.g., Tribe Suing Rival Company Over Casino Annex in Pope County, AP NEWS
(Oct.
14,
2020),
https://apnews.com/article/arkansas-lawsuits-russellville-courts29644809aef93a0bbb6ccc95ed704b0a.
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that acts as local legislation, affecting far less than the state as a whole, over
the opposition of an affected location. The aftermath in Pope County
demonstrates the inadequacy of a statewide ballot initiative process to create
local legislation in a dependably healthy manner. A close look at the text of
the ballot initiative provision itself combined with interpretive aids casts
doubt on the proposition that such a use of the ballot initiative process is
itself constitutional. This note argues that the ballot initiative resulting in
Amendment 100 to the Arkansas Constitution of 1874 was unconstitutional
because the people of Arkansas as a whole have not reserved the power to
enact local legislation, and further that the ballot initiative process is unsuited generally for enacting local legislation on a statewide level.
Part II of this note gives a brief explanation of how the ballot initiative
works and traces the sometimes-murky path the Supreme Court of Arkansas
has followed in defining local legislation. Part III then explores the history
of the ballot initiative in Arkansas and how Arkansans have used the process
to enact legislation. Part IV examines how Arkansans have approached enacting local legislation in the past, especially through the ballot initiative
process. In particular, Part IV focuses on the amendment to the ballot initiative provision, which clarified counties’ and municipalities’ power to use the
ballot initiative process to enact local legislation. Part V examines the textual arguments against Arkansans’ exercise of local legislative power at the
state level, while Part VI looks at the policy arguments against it. Lastly,
Part VII applies these concepts to Amendment 100, arguing that in enacting
Amendment 100, the people of Arkansas exceeded the power they reserved
in the ballot initiative process.
II.

OVERVIEW OF BALLOT INITIATIVES AND LOCAL LEGISLATION

Understanding how ballot initiatives and local legislation intersect in
the passage of Amendment 100 requires a general knowledge of each of
those concepts separately. Part A of this section looks at how ballot initiatives work, both in the United States more broadly and the particular form
the process has taken here in Arkansas. Part B focuses only on Arkansas in
discussing how to define local legislation and how the voters, legislators,
and Supreme Court of Arkansas have treated it over the years.
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Ballot Initiatives14

Ballot initiatives are a common legislative device, available in nearly
half the states.15 Arkansas is one of fourteen states, along with the District of
Columbia, which have a “direct initiative” process.16 An additional seven
states have a modified “indirect initiative” process.17
A direct initiative is characterized by “submission of proposed statutes
to the ballot for a popular vote without any intervention of the state legislature.”18 Arkansas has a typical direct initiative provision. Arkansas’s Initiative and Referendum provision is incorporated into the beginning of the
Legislative Department section of the Arkansas Constitution.19 The current
text provides as follows: “The legislative power of the people of this State
shall be vested in a General Assembly, . . . but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose legislative measures, laws and amendments to
the Constitution, and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of
the General Assembly.”20
The purpose of the ballot initiative process is to provide voters with a
way around the legislative process, but the initiative is a potentially dangerous tool. Ballot initiatives are specifically designed to bypass the traditional
legislative process,21 and the very circumvention ballot initiatives achieve is
a double-edged sword, drawing both praise and blame. When ballot initiatives first became popular in the early 1900s, they were introduced as a way
to counteract legislatures overly influenced by “monied interests.”22 To this
day ballot initiatives are often touted as pure expressions of the People’s
will.23 Practical developments, though, have cast doubt on the legitimacy of
14. The initiative process generally has been challenged as a violation of the Guaranty
Clause of Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution of the United States, though the Supreme
Court of the United States held soon after states began using these processes that the issue is
a non-justiciable political question. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118
(1912). That discussion is beyond the scope of this note but is an important aspect of the
conversation surrounding direct democracy.
15. HAREL ARNON, A THEORY OF DIRECT LEGISLATION 18 (2008); see also Julian N.
Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1509 n.22 (1990) (discussing
the variations on direct democracy available in different states and listing the states in which
they are available).
16. ARNON, supra note 15, at 18; ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
17. ARNON, supra note 15, at 18.
18. Id.
19. See ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
20. Id.
21. Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 (2003).
22. John M.A. DiPippa, The Constitutionality of the Arkansas Ballot Question Disclosure Act, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 481, 481 (1989).
23. Staszewski, supra note 21, at 399.
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the claim that ballot initiative measures avoid the influence of wellresourced private interests.24 Scholars have also noted that voters-as-a-whole
are rarely the true source of ballot initiatives; instead, voters are typically
accepting or rejecting initiatives put forth by special interest groups.25
Ballot initiatives have inherent dangers in their operation and application because none of the accountability or safeguards built into our political
system of representative democracy check the ballot-initiative method of
legislating.26 The representative legislative process “offers time for reflection, exposure to competing needs, and occasions for transforming preferences.”27 “Popular masses,” on the other hand, “too quickly form preferences, fail adequately to consider the interests of others, and are overly susceptible to contagious passions and the deceit of eloquent and ambitious
leaders.”28 Compounding these problems in practice, ballot initiative
measures often enact law in vexed and controversial areas of policy, even
while they leave behind the safeguards intended to keep legislation wellgrounded and rational.29
The initiative process operates beyond the statewide level. In Arkansas,
the current initiative provision specifically provides for ballot initiatives at
the county and municipal levels.30 The people of Arkansas emphatically
intended for the ballot initiative to function on this smaller scale: after the
Supreme Court of Arkansas held that there was no such power in the initiative provision as originally adopted, voters amended the Constitution to clarify that the voters of municipalities and counties can use the process to enact
local legislation.31
B.

Local Legislation

Local legislation in Arkansas has had a troubled history. At the state
legislature level, Amendment 14 to the Arkansas Constitution prohibits the
General Assembly from passing any local or special act.32 Arkansans passed
24. See DiPippa, supra note 22, at 481–82 (summarizing concerns surrounding the power of financial interests and citing a study that found “the financially dominant side won
eleven out of the fourteen ballot contests studied”).
25. Staszewski, supra note 21, at 399.
26. Id. at 398.
27. Eule, supra note 15, at 1527.
28. Id. at 1526–27.
29. Staszewski, supra note 21, at 396, 398.
30. See ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
31. See infra Part III.
32. ARK. CONST. amend. XIV. Local laws are also distinct from special laws in that
special laws apply to specific people or groups of people, while “local” refers specifically to
geographical distinctions. Streight v. Ragland, 280 Ark. 206, 213, 655 S.W.2d 459, 463 n.10
(1983).
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this amendment by ballot initiative at a time when the General Assembly
was spending massive amounts of time considering and enacting local legislation.33 The new amendment replaced earlier constitutional provisions that
had tried to hedge the legislature’s involvement in local legislation, but that
the legislature had routinely ignored.34
A prohibition against local legislation of course requires an answer as
to what constitutes local legislation. On its face, Arkansas case law draws a
deceptively simple distinction between general and local legislation. Early
cases define the difference straightforwardly, but later courts have applied
the law in surprising or even twisted ways without explicitly overruling prior decisions. The difference between a general law and a local law is easy to
say but harder to identify in action: a general law applies to the whole state
without making any geographical distinctions;35 a local law applies only to
part of the state rather than applying equally to the entire state.36 A law cannot be a general law and a local law at the same time; the two are incompatible.37
The effect of a law is what renders it local legislation, not its language.38 For example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held in Thomas v.
Foust that a law that applied only to “those portions of school districts
which become cut off from the body of the district by a reservoir and in cases where the students of the portion cut off must travel more than 20 miles
through another school district to attend school in their own district” was a
local or special law, impermissibly enacted by the legislature.39 What made
it local, though, was not the classification itself, which might have been
permissible,40 but instead it was the “nonprospective” nature of the classification—to fall under the statute, the school district must have qualified on
January 1, 1964.41 Thus, the specific areas to which the law applied were
already determined, and there was no way for the law’s remedies to apply to
other school districts that might later find themselves in the same situation.42

33. Mark James Chaney, Comment, Streight Curve: The Knuckleball Interpretation of
“Local and Special Acts”, 66 ARK. L. REV. 705, 708–10 (2013).
34. Id.
35. Bd. of Trs. v. Beard, 273 Ark. 423, 426, 620 S.W.2d 295, 296 (1981) (quoting
Thomas v. Foust, 245 Ark. 948, 951, 435 S.W.2d 793, 795 (1969)).
36. Id.; see also Webb v. Adams, 180 Ark. 713, 23 S.W.2d 617 (1929) (finding a law to
be local legislation that applied to all of Arkansas except for two counties and a school district).
37. Webb, 180 Ark. at 716, 23 S.W.2d at 619.
38. Id.
39. 245 Ark. 948, 952, 435 S.W.2d 793, 795–96 (1969).
40. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
41. Thomas, 245 Ark. at 952, 435 S.W.2d at 796.
42. Id.
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In practice, Amendment 14 has not acted as an absolute bar to legislation that applies to less than the whole state.43 The Supreme Court of Arkansas explained in Simpson v. Matthews that the legislature may enact laws
that only apply to specific areas of the state so long as the geographical classifications have a “reasonable relation” to legislative goals.44 The Simpson
court further clarified that to meet this standard, the classification had to “be
based upon substantial distinction which makes one class really different
from another . . . . [and] some material reason suggested by some difference
in the situation of the subject which would suggest the necessity for different legislation with respect to them.”45 A strong presumption of constitutionality under standards of judicial review has led to a body of case law
upholding a variety of classifications as reasonably related to legislative
purposes, even when they apply only to a very small portion of the state.46
At the time the court decided Phillips v. Giddings in 1983, it still emphasized that the class in the statute in question was an open class and
“[p]rospectively, a substantial number or all of the state’s [school] districts
could fall within this classification,” but the prohibition on local legislation
had lost much of what force it ever had.47 Less than fifteen years later, the
court upheld a statute that expressly applied only to Pulaski County because
it found there was a rational basis for geographically limiting the application
of the law.48 Despite the sometimes bizarre interpretation and the strong
reluctance of the Supreme Court of Arkansas to invalidate any laws on the
basis of this definition, the statement that local legislation “arbitrarily applies to one geographic division of [the] state to the exclusion of the rest of
the state” remains the letter of the law.49

43. See generally Webb, 180 Ark. 713, 23 S.W.2d 617.
44. 184 Ark. 213, 217–18, 40 S.W.2d 991, 992–93 (1931).
45. Id. at 218, 40 S.W.2d at 993. The court held that there was no reasonable relationship between a law granting county courts the right to condemn lands to build reservoirs in
hilly and mountainous counties and the same law’s requirement that the county have a population of 75,000 or more. It therefore invalidated the law as improperly enacted local legislation. Id.
46. See, e.g., Phillips v. Giddings, 278 Ark. 368, 646 S.W.2d 1 (1983) (upholding statute
that applied at the time of enactment only to one county); Le Maire v. Henderson, 174 Ark.
936, 298 S.W. 327 (1927) (same).
47. Phillips, at 371, 646 S.W.2d at 2.
48. McCutchen v. Huckabee, 328 Ark. 202, 210, 943 S.W.2d 225, 228 (1997). By this
logic-defying linguistic trick, the court found that the act “was not local legislation,” despite
its explicit application to one county only, with no other possible participants. Id.
49. Id. at 208, 943 S.W.2d at 227.
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ARKANSAS’S BALLOT INITIATIVE PROVISION

History and Development

Arkansas’s Initiative and Referendum provision has developed over
time, and the changes it has sustained are important to understanding how it
interacts with local legislative power. As originally enacted in 1910, the
initiative and referendum provision said, “‘The people of each municipality,
each county and of the State reserve to themselves power to propose laws
and amendments to the Constitution, and to enact or reject the same at the
polls, independent of the legislative assembly.’”50 Later the court would note
that “no one doubts . . . that the people . . . thought they were providing for
local legislation in counties by initiating acts.”51
In Hodges v. Dawdy, however, the court found that there was no way to
interpret the original provision in such a way as to allow counties and municipalities to enact local legislation without leading to untenable results.52
Of particular note for the purposes of this note, the Hodges court held that
the people of the counties could not reserve the power to themselves to enact
any legislation because they did not have that power in the first place; they
had no inherent legislative power apart from the people of the state as a
whole.53 The court added the caveat that it did “not mean to say that the
word ‘reserve’ could not be used in a sense which meant a delegation of
power.”54
After Hodges, the people of Arkansas amended the Initiative and Referendum provision to clarify the power of the people of the counties and
municipalities to use direct democracy procedures for local legislative purposes.55 The newly amended provision, still in force today, covers that power in a section entitled “Local for Municipalities and Counties.”56 It provides
that “[t]he initiative and referendum powers of the people are hereby further
reserved to the legal voters of each municipality and county as to all local,
special and municipal legislation of every character in and for their respective municipalities and counties.”57 The only limitation given as to subject

50. Dozier v. Ragsdale, 186 Ark. 654, 655–56, 55 S.W.2d 779, 780 (1932) (quoting
1909 Ark. Acts 1239).
51. Id. at 656, 55 S.W.2d at 780.
52. 104 Ark. 583, 597, 149 S.W. 656, 662 (1912).
53. Id. at 595, 149 S.W.2d at 660–61.
54. Id. at 595, 149 S.W.2d at 661; see also infra Part V.
55. See generally Dozier, 186 Ark. 654, 55 S.W.2d 779.
56. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
57. Id.
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matter is that local legislation may not contradict the Arkansas Constitution
or a general law of the state.58
The court’s reasoning in Dozier v. Ragsdale, one of the first cases to
interpret the freshly amended initiative provision, sheds light on the intended use of the initiative in the context of local laws.59 The Dozier court found
a great deal of significance in the people revising the amendment to plainly
give initiative power to the counties.60 The court notes that the reframing in
plain language demonstrated a clear intention on the people’s part to keep
the power to pass all local laws.61 Importantly, the court found that the people demonstrated that intention by putting in place a mechanism for county
and municipality-level initiatives.62
The court also drew a connection between the amendment of the initiative provision and the passage of Amendment 14.63 Amendment 14 forbade
the legislature from creating local and special legislation.64 This restriction
can only be significant in combination with the initiative provision amendment allowing local initiatives if the court held the underlying assumption
that the initiative process would only be used on a county or municipality
level to enact local legislation. If the court had a statewide initiative in mind,
there would be no significance between the co-incident enactment of
Amendment 14 and the amendment to the initiative provision.
Later cases developed this same theme of the significance of the
amended provision in the context of local legislation. In Tindall v. Searan,
the Supreme Court of Arkansas again discussed the amendment to the initiative process, saying, “The fact that the people adopted this provision [allowing county and municipal-level initiatives] a second time, . . . shows clearly
that the people intended to reserve to themselves the right to pass all local
laws affecting the counties.”65 Again, this change does not bear the significance the court attributes to it if the original provision (on a statewide level)
allowed for local legislation.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
186 Ark. 654, 55 S.W.2d 779 (1932).
Id. at 656–58, 55 S.W.2d at 780.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 657–8, 55 S.W.2d at 780–81.
See supra Part II.B.
192 Ark. 173, 177, 90 S.W.2d 476, 478 (1936).
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Putting It into Practice: Arkansans and the Ballot Initiative in Action

Over the years, Arkansans have used the initiative power many times
on a statewide level.66 A review of ballot titles and election results from
1938 until 2018 shows that initiated acts and amendments have appeared in
most general elections,67 and such measures both pass and fail regularly.68
The initiative has typically been used to enact statewide laws and amendments that apply throughout Arkansas.69
There have been some attempts to use statewide ballot initiatives to enact legislation that only applies to specific counties.70 These have had a surprisingly focused subject matter: there has been a strong connection between
local legislation and proposed amendments dealing with gambling. 71 As
discussed below, this is the type of controversial subject matter that is particularly problematic at the intersection of ballot initiatives and local legislation.72 One of the previous gambling amendments naming a specific county
has been passed.73
It does not appear that anyone has challenged the use of the statewide
ballot initiative to enact local legislation, possibly because attempts to use
the ballot initiative that way have been fairly rare and no amendment until
now has passed over the opposition of the affected locale. Because no one
has asked, the question of whether Arkansans have the power to use the initiative this way remains open. The rest of this note attempts to answer that
question.
IV.

THE TEXTUAL ARGUMENT: DO ARKANSANS HAVE THE POWER TO
ENACT LOCAL LEGISLATION BY STATEWIDE INITIATIVE?

Arkansans’ power to enact legislation through the initiative comes directly from Article V, Section I, of the Arkansas Constitution (hereinafter
66. See Arkansas Secretary of State, Initiatives and Amendments 1938–2018,
https://www.sos.arkansas.gov/uploads/elections/Initiatives_and_Amendments_19382018_1.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) (listing nearly one hundred initiated acts and amendments since 1938).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Id. (See, e.g., Proposed Amendment 50 of 1956, to permit horse racing and parimutuel wagering in Hot Springs; Proposed Amendment 55 of 1964, to allow wagering in
Garland County; Proposed Amendment 4 of 1996, to allow voters in Hot Springs to authorize
gambling and to establish a lottery; Proposed Amendment 5 of 2000, to authorize casino
gambling in Sebastian, Pulaski, Garland, Miller, Crittenden, and Boone Counties.).
72. See infra Part VI.
73. ARK. CONST. amend. XLVI (“Horse racing and pari-mutuel wagering thereon shall
be lawful in Hot Springs, Garland County, Arkansas.”).
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the “Initiative and Referendum provision” or “I & R provision”). The I & R
provision, though broad, is not all-encompassing. The provision begins with
the statement, “The legislative power of the people of this State shall be
vested in a General Assembly.”74 Accordingly, the legislative power is by
default vested in the legislature, not the people. The I & R provision reserves specific, delineated powers to the people, rather than a general legislative power.75 The effect of the I & R provision is to carve out specific
powers reserved to the people, and nothing in the provision implies that the
people have reserved any powers beyond those named and described in the
provision.76
The text of the portion relating to local initiatives supports the idea that
the provision intended to leave local legislation to the counties and municipalities. The language authorizing counties and municipalities to utilize the
initiative and referendum powers sweeps as broadly as possible: “The initiative and referendum powers of the people are hereby further reserved to the
legal voters of each municipality and county as to all local, special and municipal legislation of every character in and for their respective municipalities and counties.”77 The only limitation is that the local legislation cannot
contradict the Constitution or a general law of Arkansas.78
The wording of this very limitation on subject matter suggests that the I
& R provision was drafted with the expectation that local legislation would
not be enacted on a statewide level. General laws are by definition not local
legislation,79 so by including the Constitution in the same phrase as “general
laws,” the I & R provision as amended assumes that the Constitution will
function as generally applicable principles, not a substitute for local legislation. Under the I & R provision, it is barely more difficult to enact a constitutional amendment than a general law.80 An initiative for a constitutional
amendment requires the signature of ten percent of voters, while an initiative for any other type of law requires the signatures of only eight percent.81
However, any measure, including an initiated amendment to the Constitution, becomes law if it receives a majority of votes cast on that measure.82
Interpreting the I & R provision to mean that the people can enact only gen-

74. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
75. Id. (“The first power reserved by the people is the initiative. . . The second power
reserved by the people is the referendum.”).
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Webb v. Adams, 180 Ark. 713, 716, 23 S.W.2d 617, 619 (1929).
80. See ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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eral laws but may freely enact constitutional amendments that function as
local legislation would make such a limitation toothless.
The history behind the amendment of the initiative provision also supports the proposition that the text was not intended to convey local legislative power to the people of the state as a whole. As discussed above,83 the I
& R provision was amended in response to Hodges v. Dawdy.84 The Hodges
court based its holding that the original I & R provision did not permit local
initiatives in part by reasoning from the premise (based in the language of
the provision) that “[t]he [I & R provision] does not confer power. It reserves it.”85 Therefore, the court reasoned, the I & R provision as originally
enacted did not include a local legislation power because the people of each
municipality and county did not have any pre-existing legislative power to
reserve.86 However, the court left open that possibility that “the word ‘reserve’ . . . could be used in a sense which meant a delegation of power.”87
Evidently, the amendment to the I & R provision after Hodges used
“reserve” in precisely the sense that the Hodges court contemplated as a
possibility but rejected in the context of the earlier provision. As it stood
after the amendment and to this day, the I & R provision “reserve[s]” the
initiative and referendum powers to the voters of the municipalities and
counties.88 Under the Hodges court’s reasoning, this use of the word “reserve” cannot mean that the voters of the municipalities and counties intended to keep power they already had, and instead must mean that the I & R
provision delegates local legislative power to the smaller political units in
question. Delegation, as a concept, usually implies that the delegating party
has entrusted the task to the delegate, rather than simultaneously maintaining authority or responsibility to complete the same task.
The Dozier v. Ragsdale court implicitly followed this same line of reasoning when it interpreted the amendment to the I & R provision as
“show[ing] clearly that [the people] intended to reserve to themselves the
right to pass all local laws affecting the counties.”89 If the people’s reservation of statewide power included the power to enact local legislation, then
the significance of the amendment would not be to ensure the power to enact
local legislation. Instead, its significance would only be that the people of
the municipalities and counties also have the power to enact certain legislation. Accordingly, the amendment of the I & R provision constituted a dele-

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See supra Part III.
104 Ark. 583, 149 S.W. 656 (1912).
Id. at 595, 149 S.W. at 660.
Id.
Id. at 595, 149 S.W. at 661.
ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
186 Ark. 654, 655–57, 55 S.W.2d 779, 780 (1932).
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gation of local legislative authority to the counties and municipalities, rather
than simply an additional way to pass local legislation.
V.

THE POLICY ARGUMENT: SHOULD ARKANSANS ENACT LOCAL
LEGISLATION BY STATEWIDE INITIATIVE?

Regardless of whether or not Arkansans in fact reserved the power to
enact local legislation through the statewide initiative process, there are
compelling reasons not to use this method of legislating. Flaws common to
the initiative process at any level make it uniquely unsuited for enacting
local legislation.
To begin with, initiatives are frequently used to address controversial
topics, making the resulting legislation unusually inflammatory.90 The history of ballot initiatives in Arkansas is illustrative of the unintended consequences this phenomenon can have when a statewide initiative undertakes to
enact local legislation.91 Gambling, one of the most controversial topics Arkansas ballot initiatives has addressed consistently, has historically been tied
to attempted local legislation.92 When statewide initiatives impose particular
controversial regulations on a subset of the state (regardless of whether that
portion wants it), the process should increase concern over the specter of the
“tyranny of the majority” already raised by direct democracy.93
Relatedly, voters will inevitably have varying degrees of interest in a
particular measure.94 This circumstance is known as the “intensity problem.”95 The intensity problem, though a concern in any exercise of direct
democracy, is exacerbated by the use of a statewide initiative to enact local
legislation.96 Local legislation by definition applies only to part of the state,
so the portion of the population living in that area will automatically have a
greater interest than the rest of the state, while the remaining population will
90. Staszewski, supra note 21, at 396–97 (“The 2000 elections . . . placed directly before
voters the issues of school vouchers, physician-assisted suicide, same-sex marriage and other
gay and lesbian rights, gun control, campaign finance reform, bilingual education, gambling,
medical use of marijuana, and sentencing for drug offenders, as well as . . . tax reform and
environmental policy.”).
91. See infra Part VI.
92. See infra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.
93. See Staszewski, supra note 21, at 401–06.
94. Sherman J. Clark, Commentary: A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112
HARV. L. REV. 434, 450–51 (1998).
95. Id. (“The paradigmatic case of the intensity problem is that of a relatively apathetic
majority prevailing over a significant minority with a great stake in the issue at hand.”).
96. See generally Dennis C. Mueller, et al., Solving the Intensity Problem in Representative Democracy, in ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC CHOICE 54 (Robert D. Leiter & Gerald Sirkin eds.,
1975), for a fuller discussion of the intensity problem in both direct and representative democracy, with a particular emphasis on the effects of geographical interests and representation.
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have a correspondingly diminished interest. In short, such a process by its
very nature amplifies the intensity problem beyond rescue.
The same circumstance opens the door to an unusual abuse: the people
of the state can “pawn off” the immediate downsides of a piece of legislation onto a portion of the state, while the rest of the people reap only the
benefits. Even if people disagree over the degree to which a measure has
downsides, as in the case of the casino licensing amendment, people do not
necessarily want to force a change on a specific group of people that does
not want it. The people who would not choose to impose a measure on unwilling recipients are left in the dark because the entire state votes on initiative measures at once.97 Someone who, knowing that the county opposed the
law, would vote against a local law enacted at the state level might vote for
the same law under the impression that “most people” would want whatever
the proposed change was. Such a voter would not find out until after the
vote that the county in question would not have chosen to enact that legislation.
The lack of political accountability in initiatives and the difficulty of
amending an initiated measure hinder any potential response to local conditions following the election. First, there is no inherent political accountability to prevent abuses of the initiative process.98 Voters are not up for reelection, nor do they necessarily have an interest in keeping a minority of the
state happy, even if the majority does not particularly care about the outcome.99 The checks and balances vital to our form of government disappear
almost entirely in the context of initiatives, leaving portions of the state vulnerable to majoritarian tyranny influenced by special interest groups.100
Furthermore, initiated acts, particularly amendments to the Constitution, are difficult to amend or repeal. In the case of all initiated legislation
besides constitutional amendments, measures can be amended or repealed
only by another vote on another initiative, or by a two-thirds vote of the
relevant legislative body.101 In the case of local legislation, even if originally
enacted on a statewide level, the General Assembly is limited to amending
the law to make it a general law or repealing it altogether.102 Either option
still requires a two-thirds majority.103

97. See ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“All measures initiated by the people . . . shall be submitted only at the regular elections.”)
98. Staszewski, supra note 21, at 398.
99. See Clark, supra note 94, at 450–51.
100. See Staszewski, supra note 21, at 421, 436.
101. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
102. ARK. CONST. amend. XIV; Hall v. Ragland, 276 Ark. 350, 358, 635 S.W.2d 228, 233
(1982).
103. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1.
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For constitutional amendments, the legislature has no direct way to
change the initiated amendment.104 A majority of the legislature may approve a proposed amendment to the Constitution for submission to the voters, but the legislature may refer no more than three proposed amendments
in any given election.105 As with other legislation, voters can repeal or even
make slight adjustments to the initiated amendment only by amending the
Constitution once again.
This situation is particularly problematic given the circumstances under
which voters adopt or reject initiatives. Typical voters, unlike legislators, do
not spend extensive time debating and considering proposed legislation.106
In fact, in its emphasis on making sure that the ballot title and popular name
of the measure are sufficient, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has acknowledged that voters may consider an initiative for the first time in the ballot
box.107
Consider this process in a situation like Amendment 100, which is too
long and detailed to include in its entirety on a ballot. When voters were
presented with the proposed amendment in the ballot box, this is what they
saw:
An amendment to the Arkansas Constitution to require that the Arkansas
Racing Commission issue licenses for casino gaming to be conducted at
four casinos in Arkansas, being subject to laws enacted by the General
Assembly in accord with this amendment and regulations issued by the
Arkansas Racing Commission (“Commission”); defining “casino gaming” as dealing, operating, carrying on, conducting, maintaining, or exposing for play any game played with cards, dice, equipment, or any mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic device or machine for money,
property, checks, credit, or any representative value, as well as accepting
wagers on sporting events; providing that individuals under 21 are prohibited from engaging in casino gaming; providing that the Commission
shall issue four casino licenses, one to Southland Racing Corporation
104. The I & R Provision’s requirement that “[n]o measure approved by a vote of the
people shall be amended or repealed” except by a two-thirds vote of the relevant legislative
body, combined with its definition of measure, which includes constitutional amendments,
can possibly be read as affirmatively conveying power to the legislature to amend an initiated
amendment. The Supreme Court of Arkansas, however, has rejected this reading as “inconceivable.” Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. Edgmon, 218 Ark. 207, 209–11, 235 S.W.2d 554,
556–57 (1951).
105. ARK. CONST. art. IXX, § 22.
106. See Staszewski, supra note 21, at 398 (“Those structural safeguards [of representative democracy] are designed to encourage careful deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking
[sic] in the legislative process.”).
107. See Cox v. Daniels, 374 Ark. 437, 443, 228 S.W.3d 591, 595 (2008) (“[T]he ultimate issue is whether the voter, while inside the voting booth, is able to reach an intelligent
and informed decision for or against the proposal and understands the consequences of his or
her vote based on the ballot title.”).
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(“Southland”) for casino gaming at a casino to be located at or adjacent
to Southland’s greyhound track and gaming facility in Crittenden County, one to Oaklawn Jockey Club, Inc. (“Oaklawn”) to require casino
gaming at a casino to be located at or adjacent to Oaklawn’s horse track
and gaming facility in Garland County, one to an applicant to require casino gaming at a casino to be located in Pope County within two miles of
Russellville, and one to an applicant to require casino gaming at a casino
to be located in Jefferson County within two miles of Pine Bluff; providing that upon receiving a casino license, licensees will be required to
conduct casino gaming for as long as they have a casino license providing that Southland and Oaklawn do not have to apply for a license and
will automatically receive a casino license upon the Commission adopting rules and regulations to govern casino gaming; providing that the
Commission shall require all applicants for the two remaining casino licensees, one in Pope County and one in Jefferson County to pay an application fee, demonstrate experience in conducting casino gaming, and
submit either a letter of support from the county judge or a resolution
from the county quorum court in the county where the casino would be
located and, if the proposed casino is to be located within a city, a letter
of support from the mayor of that city; providing that the Commission
shall regulate all casino licensees; defining “net casino gaming receipts”
as casino gaming receipts less amounts paid out or reserved as winnings
to casino patrons; providing that for each fiscal year, a casino licensee’s
net casino gaming receipts are subject to a net casino gaming receipts tax
of 13% on the first $150,000,000 of net casino gaming receipts or any
part thereof, and 20% on net casino gaming receipts exceeding
$150,000,001 or any part thereof; providing that no other tax, other than
the net casino gaming receipts tax, may be imposed on gaming receipts
or net casino gaming receipts; providing that the net casino gaming receipts tax shall be distributed 55% to the State of Arkansas General Revenue Fund, 17.5% to the Commission for deposit into the Arkansas Racing Commission Purse and Awards Fund to be used only for purses for
live horse racing and greyhound racing by Oaklawn and Southland, as
the case may be, 8% to the county in which the casino is located, and
19.5% to the city in which the casino is located, provided that if the casino is not located within a city, then the county in which the casino is located shall receive the 19.5%; permitting casino licensees to conduct casino gaming on any day for any portion of all of any day; permitting casino licensees to sell liquor or provide complimentary servings of liquor
during all hours in which the casino licensees conduct casino gaming only for on-premises consumption at the casinos and permitting casino licensees to sell liquor or provide complimentary servings of liquor without allowing the residents of a dry county or city to vote to approve the
sale of liquor; providing that casino licensees shall purchase liquor from
a licensed Arkansas wholesaler; permitting shipments of gambling devices that are duly registered, recorded, and labeled in accordance with
federal law into any county in which casino gaming is authorized; de-
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claring that all constitutional provisions, statutes, and common law of the
state that conflict with this amendment are not to be applied to this
Amendment.108

Expecting typical voters either to have a detailed knowledge of a proposal ahead of time or take in all this detail during the brief time in the ballot box strains credulity. In particular, voters have little incentive from a
purely personal perspective to be familiar with the details of a proposal
when the details do not necessarily affect them directly. Yet local legislation
voted on at a state level creates this very situation.
Real-life dynamics of ballot initiatives, as opposed to their mythical
status as direct expressions of the people’s will, exacerbate the problems
outlined above. Actual events cast serious doubts on the idea that ballot initiatives can avoid the influence of well-monied interest groups, the influence
that concerned the original adopters of initiative provisions.109
Instead, ballot initiatives usually get to the ballot through the efforts of
interest groups with a particular angle.110 Those interest groups are motivated to write the proposed initiatives in a way that favors the group as much as
possible while still passing the popular vote.111 The initiative process does
not have a debate or amendment stage—instead, the petition must be circulated with the full text of the proposal as it will be certified.112 Voters who
favor the general idea of a particular initiative enough to vote for it but
would choose different details for enacting it have no opportunity to try to
make those adjustments.
After an initiative has become law, it is very difficult to undo or
amend.113 The petition process is difficult, lengthy, and expensive for both
sides, with some campaigns drawing millions of dollars to support the initiative process and promotion.114 Resources can make all the difference in the

108. Knight v. Martin, 2018 Ark. 280, 2–3, 556 S.W.3d 501, 504–05. Contrast this ballot
title with the only other amendment to name a particular county, the entire text of which is as
follows: “Horse racing and pari-mutuel wagering thereon shall be lawful in Hot Springs,
Garland County, Arkansas, and shall be regulated by the General Assembly.” ARK. CONST.
amend. XLVI.
109. See DiPippa, supra note 22, at 481–82.
110. See Staszewski, supra note 21, at 420–21. Julian Eule provides an extreme example
of a petroleum company that opposed a citizens’ initiative with one of its own that tried to
“mandate onshore drilling” but “incredibly appeared to oppose offshore drilling.” Eule, supra
note 15, at 1517–18.
111. See Staszewski, supra note 21, at 422.
112. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“[E]very such petition shall include the full text of the
measure so proposed.”).
113. Supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text.
114. See DiPippa, supra note 22, at 481; see also Arkansas Ethics Commission, LocalOption/Ballot/Legislative Question Committee Filings, ARKANSAS ETHICS COMMISSION,
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outcome of a particular initiative.115 Concerned voters may be left to the
mercy of the interest groups with the necessary resources to push legislation
through this cumbersome mode of enactment. All these considerations underlie the question of whether Amendment 100 was validly enacted by the
voters of Arkansas.
VI.

IN CONTEXT: THE VALIDITY OF AMENDMENT 100

To determine whether Amendment 100 was enacted through a valid initiative, the first question to answer is whether it is in fact local legislation.
On its own terms, Amendment 100 applies only to four counties out of the
entire state.116 While the Garland and Crittenden County licenses were clearly intended to attach to the existing gambling facilities in those counties,
Jefferson and Pope Counties do not appear to have particular characteristics
that make them better suited to the purposes of the act than any number of
other counties.117 Accordingly, the amendment arbitrarily singles those
counties out for different treatment without justification. The analysis does
not even require an inquiry into the effect of the legislation to determine
whether it is local or not because it is local on its face.
The policy reasons laid out above for not enacting local legislation
through a statewide initiative are highlighted in the circumstances surrounding Amendment 100’s enactment. Gambling has been a hotly contested topic in Arkansas for years.118 Although Arkansas voters have rejected proposals to legalize various forms of gambling before, the state as a whole is
apparently ready to accept casino gaming, at least in the form in which
Amendment 100 presented the option.119 Pope County, however, soundly

http://www.arkansasethics.com/filings/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (providing required filings
listing campaign contributions to committees).
115. See DiPippa, supra note 22, at 481–85.
116. ARK. CONST. amend. C, § 4, cl (i)–(j).
117. See generally id. (providing no explanation for why Jefferson or Pope County was
chosen). This conclusion is further supported by the fact that numerous other counties have
been included in similar proposed amendments. See, e.g., Lange v. Martin, 2016 Ark. 337,
500 S.W.3d 154 (dealing with proposed amendment to license casinos in Boone, Miller, and
Washington Counties); Walmsley v. Martin, 2012 Ark. 370, 423 S.W.3d 587 (same in Pulaski, Miller, Franklin, and Crittenden Counties); Stilley v. Priest, 341 Ark. 329, 16 S.W.3d
251 (2000) (same in Sebastian, Pulaski, Garland, Miller, Crittenden, and Boone Counties);
Scott v. Priest, 326 Ark. 328, 932 S.W.2d 746 (1996) (same in Boone, Garland, Chicot, Pulaski, and Miller Counties).
118. See supra, note 117, for a sampling of proposed amendments that would have allowed casinos to operate in various parts of Arkansas.
119. Arkansas Secretary of State, Issues, 2018 GENERAL ELECTION AND NON-PARTISAN
JUDICIAL RUNOFF RESULTS FOR ARKANSAS, https://results.enr.clarityelections.com
/AR/92174/Web02-state.216038/#/ (last updated June 6, 2019, 10:09 AM).
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rejected the measure in the 2018 election.120 Gambling is a divisive topic in
Arkansas, and the “take-it-or-leave-it” nature of a ballot measure makes it
all too easy to force, unwittingly or otherwise, the consequences of a controversial decision squarely onto an unwilling recipient.
The difficulty of amending an initiated provision may have exacerbated
the turmoil over the past year. For example, neighboring Johnson County
expressed an interest in having the casino instead of Pope County, since
Pope County residents are fighting it.121 Pope County, though, is now enshrined in the state constitution as one of only four places in the state that
can legally have a casino.122 There is no simple way to make a change to that
provision. Both sides are thus stuck battling because of what was surely a
tactical error in the casino proponents’ drafting—it is hard to believe that the
would-be casino operators want to have to fight the county tooth and nail for
the necessary support for their license applications when neighboring counties are ready to welcome a casino.
Finally, Amendment 100 is the epitome of the “monied interest” concerns. It is no secret that casinos were behind the push to get the initiative on
the ballot. Potential casino operators poured money into promoting the
measure as well as actually getting the measure through logistically. 123 In
contrast, the opposition to the measure was strongest in Pope County, but
the groups fighting the provision were very low on resources.124 Here we
have a clear instance of a well-funded, very interested party using the ballot
120. Arkansas Secretary of State, 2018 General Election Results for Pope County, Arkansas, https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/AR/Pope/92233/Web02.221448/#/ (last updated
Nov. 16, 2018, 4:19 PM).
121. Max Brantley, Now Comes the Promised Effort to Move a Casino from Pope to
Johnson County. Lawsuit to Come., ARKANSAS TIMES: ARKANSAS BLOG (Feb. 26, 2019,
12:56 AM), https://arktimes.com/arkansas-blog/2019/02/26/now-comes-the-promised-effortto-move-a-casino-from-pope-to-johnson-county-lawsuit-to-come. The referenced bill failed
approximately a month later. Arkansas State Legislature, Bill Status History of HB1563,
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2019/2019R/Pages/BillInformation.aspx?measureno=
HB1563 (last visited Oct. 25, 2019).
122. The locations are limited even further than the named counties. It is not just Pope
County as a whole that is one of only four acceptable places; the Amendment requires that
the casino be within two miles of the county seat. ARK. CONST. amend. C, § 4, cl. (k).
123. See Arkansas Ethics Commission, Local-Option/Ballot/Legislative Question Committee Filings, ARKANSAS ETHICS COMMISSION, http://www.arkansasethics.com (last visited
Oct. 27, 2019). The three main ballot committees in support of Amendment 100 (then “Issue
4”), Driving Arkansas Forward, It’s Our Turn, and Jobs for Pope County, received total contributions of $7,052,830.00, $2,629,426.65, and $70,000.00 respectively. Id.
124. Id. In contrast to the above, Family Council Action Committee BCQ, Ensuring Arkansas’ Future, and Citizens for a Better Pope County a/k/a Citizens for Local Choice, the
ballot committees opposing the amendment, received $1,600.00, $4,600.00, and $5,215.00
respectively. Vote No on Issue 4, Inc., also registered as a ballot committee opposing the
amendment and reported $150,300.00 in contributions but did not report any expenditures as
of the election. Id.

106

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

initiative to push through a measure that strongly favors casinos. Coupled
with the amendment’s localized effect, these factors have turned the
amendment into poison for Pope County’s local government.125
A.

What This Note Is Not Arguing

This article is not arguing that the subject matter of Amendment 100 as
a constitutional amendment is somehow in and of itself unconstitutional. It
is a well-established principle that any amendment to a constitution automatically amends any portion of the existing constitution that is contrary to
the amendment.126 Furthermore, Amendment 100 explicitly states that any
conflicting provisions of the Constitution or other laws are voided by the
amendment.127 If validly enacted, then, Amendment 100 abrogates any contradictory provisions and must be “constitutional.” The question is whether
the people of Arkansas reserved to themselves the power to enact Amendment 100 in the particular manner set forth in the I & R provision.
Amendments must be enacted according to set procedures; this principle underlies provisions like the I & R provision,128 which lays out one way
to amend the Constitution.129 By extension, then, if a measure is enacted out
of accord with the prescribed procedures, it is invalid.130 Otherwise there
would be no point in establishing any procedures at all. The people, like the
legislature, must follow the guidelines set forth in the Constitution; “it is
fundamental that the people, themselves, are bound by their own Constitution.”131
Similar uncontroversial limitations extend to the people’s power to enact measures on particular subject matter. For example, in Donovan v. Priest
the Supreme Court of Arkansas struck down a proposed measure on the
grounds that it was an attempt to indirectly propose an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.132 In coming to that conclusion, the court
125. See supra Part I.
126. Hodges v. Dawdy, 104 Ark. 583, 591, 149 S.W. 656, 659 (1912) (“The amendment
being the last expression of the popular will in shaping the organic law of the State, all provisions of the Constitution which are necessarily repugnant thereto must, of course, yield, and
all others remain in force.”).
127. ARK. CONST. amend. C, § 10.
128. See supra Part III.
129. Other provisions govern additional procedures for amending the Arkansas Constitution and specify the procedures that must be followed in those instances. See, e.g., ARK.
CONST. art. IXX, § 22; ARK. CONST. amend. LXX, § 2.
130. See Martin v. Humphrey, 2018 Ark. 295, at 8, 558 S.W.3d 370, 376 (holding an
attempted referred amendment unconstitutional because it did not comply with article IXX,
section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution).
131. Moore v. Brown, 165 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Mo. 1942) (citing 1 COOLEY ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 81 (8th ed.)).
132. 326 Ark. 353, 371, 931 S.W.2d 119, 119 (1996).
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adopted this language: “the pertinent issue in cases such as this one ‘is not
the hypothetical question whether the law, if passed, would be constitutionally defective; rather it is . . . whether the measure’s proponents are entitled
to invoke the direct legislation process at all.’”133 The Donovan court was
dealing with a potential conflict with the United States Constitution, but it
recognized that there are “constitutional limitations [on the I & R powers
that] derive from both the United States Constitution and this state’s constitution.”134 Thus, the people’s right to invoke the initiative power is bounded
by the guidelines laid out in Article V. For all the reasons discussed above,
the I & R provision does not permit the enactment of an amendment like
Amendment 100.
The initiative process in Illinois provides an analogous situation, but
one where this principle is easier to see in action because the Illinois Constitution so clearly delineates limitations on the subject matter for which voters
can invoke the initiative process. Under the Illinois Constitution, voters can
propose constitutional amendments through the initiative process, but initiated amendments may only deal with “structural and procedural subjects
contained in Article IV.”135 For other subject matter, the initiative is not a
valid way to amend the Constitution.136 This subject-matter requirement is a
threshold issue for the validity of a proposed amendment: in order for a proposed initiated amendment to go to Illinois voters, it “must comply with the
procedure and the limitations on amendment set out in section 3.”137
If the people of Arkansas wish to use the initiative process to enact local legislation in the form of constitutional amendments, then the proper
course would be for them to first amend the initiative provision itself to
permit that use of the initiative process, like the people did post-Hodges to
allow for local use of the initiative and referendum processes.138 Of course,
everyone would then bear the risk that his or her own county, town, school
district, or other division would someday be targeted for a measure that the
voter opposes.139 Unless and until the people of Arkansas go down that road,
initiated amendments should be restricted to the general laws and correspondingly general amendments that the current I & R provision authorizes
at a statewide level.
133. Id. at 359, 931 S.W.2d 119, 119 (second emphasis added) (quoting James D. Gordon
III & David B. Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 298, 314 (1989)).
134. Donovan, 326 Ark. at 358, 931 S.W.2d at 119.
135. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
136. Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 63 N.E.3d 824, 826 (2016).
137. Coal. for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 359 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Ill.
1976).
138. See supra Part II.A.
139. This problem is in addition to all the policy problems discussed in Part VI, supra,
which counsel strongly against such a choice.
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There are certain situations, including invalid subject matter, that can
call into question the ability of the electorate to use the initiative process in
the first place. The ballot initiative that is now known as Amendment 100
exceeded the scope of the power the people of Arkansas reserved to themselves under the I & R provision. When the people are not entitled to invoke
the direct legislation process, the resulting legislation cannot retroactively
validate itself.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Amendment 100 and the turmoil it has caused highlight the weaknesses
of the underlying legislative procedures. Ballot initiatives, regardless of their
other potential benefits, do not lend themselves to enacting local legislation
on a statewide level. A careful reading of the I & R provision reveals that
the Arkansas constitution does not grant voters the right to use this risky
method of law-making, nor should it. The fallout is too ruinous.
When voters try to use initiatives to legislate for a smaller subset of the
state, the process amplifies the weaknesses that already exist within a direct
democracy system: the intensity problem, the potential for a “tyranny of the
majority,” the lack of checks on the legislative process, the difficulty of
amending initiated provisions to reflect what voters want, and the ability of
monied interests to push through legislation. These problems plague direct
democracy in some measure regardless of the form it takes, but the inherent
inequality between the group legislating and the group primarily affected
makes these problems even worse in the situation described above.
The text of the I & R provision does not reserve to voters the right to
use the initiative process in such a manner, the history and interpretation of
the provision support that conclusion, and policy counsels strongly against
using the initiative process that way. The ballot initiative process behind
Amendment 100 was faulty, invalidating the amendment.
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